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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. 
Using a two-stage model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, we show that 
EU anti-dumping policy that takes the form of  price-undertakings offers a powerful protection to 
domestic firms, but only at the price competition stage. Once the impact of  the A-D policy on quality 
choices is taken into account, European Welfare as well as profits accruing to the domestic firm 
decrease whenever the free trade equilibrium is affected. Hence we show that European Antidumping 
policies may induce ''perverse'' leapfrogging. 
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According to the European anti-dumping legislation (A-D  policy herafter), whenever a foreign 
product, which is  "similar"  to a  European one is  "dumped"  on the European market, trade 
protection can be imposed (EC regulation 386/94).  The procedure follows two main steps.  As-
suming dumping (Le.  price discrimination between national markets) has been established,l the 
legislation aims at eliminating price-undercutting of European products in the European market. 
This protectionist policy is justified by the idea that dumping should be viewed as unfair com-
petition, so that the resulting "injury"  caused to the European industry must be compensated 
for.  More specifically, the A-D  policy aims then at eliminating the injury as measured by the 
extent of the"  injury margin" , grossly defined as the extent of foreign price-undercutting in the 
European market (Vermulst and Waer (1991)).  In order to eliminate the injury, the Commission 
may either impose a  duty or accept a  price-undertaking.  Price-undertakings are best viewed 
as commitments by the foreign competitors to match the price of the European product in the 
European market.  A price-undertaking forces  the foreign  firm to 'meet' the price set by the 
European producer of the 'like product' in the European market.  In this paper we  focus on 
antidumping protection taking the form of price-undertakings which is arguably the most popu-
lar type of antidumping measures used by the European Commission.2  According to Tharakan 
(1994),  undertakings have accounted for  about 72  per cent of the antidumping/countervailing 
duties cases terminated by the European Commission during the period 1980-87.  Tharakan 
(1994)  identifies a variety of reasons for  such a marked preference.  According to his  empiri-
cal analysis, trade policy considerations seem to play an important role in the choice between 
undertakings and duties. 
The way the European Commission calculates the injury margin in European antidumping 
cases  has often been criticized.3  Moreover,  the relation between observed  price-undercutting 
1 Legal dumping occurs whenever the price charged by a foreign producer on its own market is higher than the 
price charged in its export market (in the present case the European one). 
2The case of a duty will briefly be discussed in the paper but results under a  duty will appear to be quite 
similar to those obtained under price-undertakings. 
3Vermulst and Waer (1991) offers a detailed analysis of the difficulties as well as of the possible arbitrariness 
involved in computing injury margin. 
1 and real dumping is subject to criticism.  Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) for example have 
shown that foreign  price-undercutting can be the result of a cost advantage of a foreign firm 
selling a differentiated product on the EU market.  Foreign price-undercutting then reflects a 
competitive advantage rather than unfair trade practices by the foreign  importer.  This note 
aims at putting forward an additional argument that shows the perverse effects induced by the 
policy and casts doubt on the economic rational of the injury determination. 
According to the regulation, the legislator allows for  price differences between a European 
and a foreign product when they differ in characteristics (EU regulation 386/94 §3 section D.10). 
There are however cases where quality differences  between domestic and foreign products are 
acknowledged, but no price adjustments were made.  For example in 1987, a Russian importer of 
'standardized electrical motors' in the EU was accused of dumping and injury to the Community 
industry because of selling at a lower price than the European standardized electrical motors. 
The Russian exporter argued that the Commission when making a price comparison between 
European motors and Russian  motors,  should take into account  'the  differences  in physical 
characteristics,  the poor brand image of USSR products,  the lower quality of raw materials and 
the  lower efficiency of after sales service compared to  Community products' (L  83/4 27.3. '87). 
A (former) GDR exporter of motors equally alleged of dumping and injury in the same case, 
pointed out to the Commission that 'its products contained a lower active material content than 
most motors manufactured by  Community competitors '.  Furthermore it was argued that there 
were other technical differences between the motors such as  'electricity input,  axle height,  noise 
and vibration levels  of motors' which should be taken into account when comparing prices  (L 
83/427.3.'87). 
In response to these objections the Commission replied that 'these differences did not affect 
price comparability and therefore no allowances were made '.  More in particular, the Commission 
argued that  'given  the  large  degree  of international  standardization  in the  manufacturing  of 
such motors,  each type of motor originating abroad constitutes a 'like product' to the same type 
of Community standardized  motor,  although  there  may be  differences  in quality"  (L  280/69, 
1.10.'86). 
Other cases involving obvious quality differences  can of course be found.  See for instance 
2 case 3651/88 involving Japanese dot matrix printers (Official Journal of the EC, L 317/33-44, 
of date 24.11.1988) or case 3946/88 involving polyester yarn from the US, Mexico, Taiwan and 
Korea (Official Journal of the EC, L 348/49-55, of date 17.12.1988).4  While a more systematic 
treatment of such cases  seems  called for,  it lies  beyond  the scope of the present paper.  It 
is  our belief that the cases  listed  above  illustrate the Commission's general position towards 
dumping cases involving quality differences5 These cases clearly show that the Commission can 
acknowledge the difference in quality that may exist between the foreign and European products, 
but nevertheless decide to consider the products as similar.  This implies that a lower  price for 
the foreign  product in the EU market is  considered to be injurious for  the European industry 
and antidumping protection aimed at offsetting this price difference follows.  They also show 
that A-D policies may be implemented even though products are viewed as differing in quality. 
Interestingly enough, the kind of "differences"  mentioned in this case falls  into the definition 
of what are viewed as vertically differentiated goods.  Hence, studying the implications of such 
policies on quality choices is more than a purely academic exercise. 
The argument developed in the paper can be summarized as follows.  Let us suppose that 
products exhibit different,  but sufficiently close,  quality levels.  When products are vertically 
differentiated,  equilibrium prices  reflect  quality levels.  So,  a  foreign  producer selling  a  low 
quality good  must charge a  low  price in the EU market in order to enjoy a  positive market 
share. If  the foreign product is considered to be "similar" to the European one by the European 
Commission, the foreign producer runs the risk of being subject to a price-undertaking under the 
EU antidumping laws.  As a consequence, if  forced to match the European price, the low quality 
foreign product may not survive in the market.  This risk spills over to the quality decision stage. 
We will show that with a price-undertaking, the foreign producer is less inclined to adopt a low 
quality profile.  As  a result,  both firms'  incentives with respect to quality choices are directly 
affected by the mere threat of A-D  actions at the price competition stage. 
Relying on this intuitive argument,  we  analyze the effects  of price-undertakings on price 
competition and quality choices when vertically differentiated products are likely to be considered 
'Mc Gee  (1996)  mentions several cases invovling direct comparisons of product exhibiting objective quality 
differences. 
5Thusfar, there is no indication to suggest that the Commission's policy in this respect has changed over time. 
3 a.s  'similar' in an antidumping investigation.  Note that if 'similar' only refers to horizontally 
differentiated goods, than foreign importers of vertically differentiated goods should not worry 
about the Antidumping laws in place.  As soon as they can show that the product they sell is of 
'lower quality' than the European one, they should be allowed to charge a lower price.  However, 
as shown by the previous examples, recent evidence does suggest that the definition of 'similar' 
can involve vertically differentiated (quality differences) goods. 
In what follows we shall model demand for vertically differentiated products along the lines 
developed by Mussa and Rosen [1978].  We will show that although the price-undertaking relaxes 
price-competition for the domestic firm when qualities are given, Equilibrium quality choices are 
affected in a way which always results in a reduction of European  Welfare  as  compared to  free 
tmde.  The reason is  that the presence of a price-undertaking tends to make the foreign firm 
more aggressive in the quality game.  When under free  trade the foreign firm  is  a low  quality 
producer,  a  price-undertaking will  turn it into a  quality leader in the market.  'Ib adopt low 
quality is no longer profitable when price-undertaking is in place.  This implies that the domestic 
European firm now faces  a more agressive opponent at the quality stage and is the one which 
is  the more prone to adopt a low quality.  Our findings suggest thus that a price-undertaking 
can lead to a  reversal of the quality ranking,  where the long-run foreign  quality is  upgraded 
and the domestic one downgraded compared to free  trade.  Domestic Welfare then decreases 
because of a  larger profit diversion effect.  In this respect,  we  may argue that anti-dumping 
policy tends to induce "perverse"  leapfrogging  in vertically differentiated industries.  Hence, 
when the European Commission constructs anti-dumping mea.sures that are aimed at offsetting 
foreign price-undercutting without accomodating for the fact that qualities are affected, long-run 
European Welfare may fall.  Quality upgradingof foreign imports as a response to the imposition 
of a quota or a VER is  a documented fact.6  The theoretical analysis of this paper suggests a 
similar phenomenon of quality upgrading when imports are subject to anti-dumping measures. 
Empirical validation of this prediction is called for in future research. 
In the next section we present a stylized model of vertical product differentiation and char-
acterize the associated sub  game perfect equilibria under free  trade.  We  then study the same 
"See Feenstra (1988) for evidence under VER and Aw and Roberts (1986) undera quota. 
4 two-stage game in the presence of a price-undertaking.  The subgame perfect  equilibrium of 
the modified game shows how quality choices and price competition are altered in the presence 
of antidumping protection.  In section  3,  we  comment on our main results  and look at their 
robustness.  Section 4 concludes. 
2  The Model 
Let us consider a duopoly where a European (D) and a foreign firm (F) sell vertically differen-
tiated products in the EU market only.  Firms choose quality in the first stage (long run) and 
compete in prices in the second stage (short run). 
Consumers in the European market are willing to buy at most one unit of the good and 
exhibit heterogeneous preferences.  More specifically, they are identified by their taste for quality 
x which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1].7  The net utility of consuming good i  for 
the consumer with taste x is ui = x.si - pi, where ui refers to consumers' utility, Si refers to the 
quality and pi refers to the unit price of good i. We set the default utility of no-consumption to 
zero.  With respect to quality choices in the first stage, we assume that si E  [0,1].  In order to 
keep the exposition as simple as possible, we  assume zero cost for  quality in the first stage and 
zero production cost in stage 2.  Neglecting costs mainly allows us to highlight those effects that 
are exclusively imputable to price competition and in particular to the way price-undertakings 
distort the price game.  Once this mechanism, which is independent of quality costs, has been 
revealed, the role of such costs becomes relatively straighforward.  We postpone until section 3 
a tourough discussion of this assumption.  Let us stress however that relaxing this assumption 
would not affect the qualitative implications of our results. 
2.1  The Free Trade Equilibrium 
Under the assumptions stated above, it can be shown that in the absence of trade policy there 
exist two subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies: one firm sells the best available quality 
product and the other firm chooses an optimal degree of product differentiation, i.e.  sells a low 
'Note that our assumption on the distribution of consumers' type ensures that the market is  not covered in 
equilibrium. 
5 quality product.  In the continuation price equilibrium the price of the high quality product is 
higher (i.e.  pH > pL) so that both firms enjoy a positive market share.  This standard result is 
summarized in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1  In the quality-price game,  there are two  subgame perfect equilibria.  The high quality 
firm chooses the best available  quality (i. e.  si =  1) while the low quality firm  differentiates to  a 
ratio of 4/7.  In all price subgames the  equilibrium is unique and in pure strategies. 
In the appendix we develop the argument that leads to Lemma 1 but since this result is fairly 
standard we omit a full proof.s  As they stand, the particular value of qualities in equilibrium 
essentially reflect the normalization we have made so that Lemma 1 should not be taken literally. 
Note however that the existence of an optimal degree of differentiation and the multiplicity of 
equilibria are robusts results. 
The following comments are in order.  First, under free trade, product differentiation always 
prevails in equilibrium.  For the firms  it is  never optimal to choose identical qualities because 
this would lead to pure Bertrand competition, i.e.  zero profits for  both.  Note however that 
from a domestic Welfare point of view, the first best precisely involves both firms choosing the 
best available quality and naming a price equal to marginal cost.  Since we have just seen that 
in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, product differentiation prevails, Domestic Welfare is lower 
as compared to the first best for three main reasons.  First, there is under-provision of quality. 
Second,  because of  product differentiation,  price competition is  relaxed,  so  that equilibrium 
prices  are above  marginal  costs  and some of the consumers refrain from  buying any of  the 
two products:  given product qualities, prices are too high.  Third, the foreign producer always 
makes  positive profits,  which  do  not enter domestic Welfare.  We  will  define the part of  the 
industry's profits that goes  abroad the profit  diversion effect.  Due to this "profit diversion" 
effect  a  domestic government  is  not indifferent  between the two  Subgame Perfect  Equilibria 
(SPE hereafter) identified in Lemma 1.  The equilibrium where the domestic producer is  the 
quality leader is strictly preferred. 
Under free  trade, two  quality rankings are possible in the pricing subgames.  Either the 
domestic firm  is  the high quality producer and the foreign  firm  is  the low  quality producer 
8The interested reader is referred to Choi and Shin (1992) or Wauthy (1996) for a full proof. 
6 (SD  = 1, sF = 4/7) or vice versa (sD  = 4/7, sF = 1).  It is  only in the former  case that the 
foreign firm runs the risk of being subject to the EU's Antidumping legislation. In the case where 
it produces the high quality product and hence charges a higher price in the EU market there 
is no foreign price-undercutting and thus no risk for the A-D legislation to apply.  A first result 
emerges:  antidumping policy cannot affect price competition in the cases where the foreigner is 
the quality leader.  Hence we focus hereafter on the pricing games where the domestic firm sells 
the high quality product and the foreign firm  sells the low quality product.  We keep in mind 
however that the alternative quality hierarchy remains an equally likely candidate SPE. 
2.2  Price-Undertakings and Quality choice 
Let us assume that the European authorities have decided on an antidumping law at time t =  o. 
The terms of the law are the following ones.  First, a domestic firm is allowed to file a complaint in 
case of dumping.  Following Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) we do not explicitly model the 
existence of dumping and just assume that price discrimination between the foreign market and 
the EU market prevails whereby the price on the EU market is the lower one.  There are of course 
a variety of reasons combining supply conditions and differences in demand and competitive 
conditions in the respective markets that could support such  a situation.  For instance,  even 
though demand is lower in the local market (which may typically be the case for less developed 
exporting countries), the foreign firm could benefit from a domestic monopoly position which 
allows it to charge a higher price in its local market than abroad.  When dumping prevails, the 
government will then evaluate the injury.  This injury is defined as the positive difference between 
domestic and foreign  prices.  In case the European and the foreign  product are considered as 
'similar'  products and injury is  detected, either a price-undertaking or a  duty on imports is 
implemented.  The discussion of a duty is  left for  section 3.  A price-undertaking by definition 
consists in a commitment by the foreign firm to match the domestic price.  A penaity is imposed 
on the foreign firm when the injury is not eliminated. 
Formally,  under a  price-undertaking, the low  quality foreign  firm's  best reply consists in 
matching the domestic price, i.e. rJJ  = V  (see Veugelers and Vandenbussche [1999]).  Given the 
previous specification of the anti-dumping policy, they both anticipate that whenever sF 2':  sD, 
7 the continuation price equilibrium does not lead to injury whereas it is always likely to do so 
under the alternative quality hierarchy.  Specifically, with the foreign firm selling the low quality 
product, the antidumping law comes into play and affects the free-trade outcome when products 
are 'similar'. To capture this in our model, we parameterize the 'degree of similarity' between the 
vertically differentiated goods by.6..  By definition, .6.  identifies the largest quality differential 
which would lead the Commission to consider that products are similar.  We have assumed that 
the quality chosen by either of the firms  is  indicated by s  (si  with i  =  D, F) which can lie 
between zero and 1.  The widest possible interpretation of 'similarity' then involves a  value of 
.6.  =  1.  This implies that whatever the quality difference between the European and the foreign 
product on offer,  the European authorities will always consider the two as 'similar'.  We will 
first consider the case where .6.  = 1.  This represents the most extreme case and as such will 
exaggerate the likely impact of the policy.  However, it also provides a suitable benchmark for 
less extreme situations in which .6. < 1, as discussed in section 3. 
In order to study the impact of the price-undertaking on quality choices, we first characterize 
equilibrium in price subgames which are subject to the price-undertaking. 
2.2.1  The second Stage: best replies in prices 
Recall that the only price subgames that are affected  by the ED policy are those where the 
foreign firm is the low-quality firm.  In these cases, under free trade, the foreign firm will always 
set a price lower than that of the domestic firm.9  In particular the free trade best reply for  the 
low quality firm always consists in choosing an optimal discount on the high quality product's 
price.  Thus, any possible free trade best reply causes "injury", i.e.  under the assumption that 
price-undercutting leads to a  price-undertaking, the foreign firm is  always  constrained in the 
price competition stage.  Whatever the price set by the domestic firm, the foreign firm will have 
to respect the price-undertaking by meeting the European price.  It follows  from the definition 
of vertical differentiation that in this case,  the foreign  firm  cannot enjoy a  positive demand 
and thus earns zero profits:  since it sells  a  lower quality product at the same price than the 
domestic firm, all consumers will prefer the high quality product. Therefore, a price-undertaking 
9 See the appendix for a detailed analysis. 
8 turns the domestic producer into a monopolist whereas the profits of the foreign firm under the 
undertaking is  invariably nil when it sells a  strictly lower  quality.  The optimal price for  the 
domestic firm is the monopoly price.  Since the foreign firm is forced to match this price despite 
its lower quality, the domestic firm enjoys the full monopoly profits. 
A£J mentioned previously, assuming that ~  = 1 leads to the most extreme form of protection: a 
price-undertaking is beneficial at the price stage to the domestic firm by completely relaxing price-
competition in the market.  However, we will now argue that in the long run, the conclusion is 
reversed. 
2.2.2  The first Stage analysis: best replies in qualities 
We only need to study the best replies in quality under the hierarchy sD  ;:::  sF. Recall indeed that 
in the alternative hierarchy, anti-dumping is ineffective, so that the analysis of quality choices 
exactly replicates the free  trade one:  against a  high foreign  quality,  the domestic  producer 
optimally differentiates with a lower  quality.  Therefore  (sD  =  4/7, sF  =  1)  remains a SPE 
of the full  game with price-undertaking.  We  consider  now the alternative hierarchy.  From 
the analysis of the price subgames we know that in the presence of a  price-undertaking, the 
European producer becomes a monopolist whenever it sells the high quality. It is immediate to 
show that in this case its best reply in quality is independent of the other's action and consists 
of choosing the highest possible quality.  Therefore against any sF < 1,  the best reply of the 
domestic producer is  sD = 1.  On the other hand, against sF = 1,  the domestic firm is better 
off differentiating.  Recall indeed that if products are identical there exists a unique symmetric 
equilibrium (the pure Bertrand equilibrium) in the corresponding price subgame where no injury 
prevails.1° 
To choose a lower quality like in the case of free trade is  no longer optimal for  the foreign 
producer. If  it were to do so its market share in the pricing game would be zero under a price-
lONote  that even  if we  assume that a  price-undertaking applies in the case of homogeneous  products, the 
unique equilibrium is still the Bertrand equilibrium exhibiting marginal cost pricing. The reason is that although 
the foreign firm can no longer undercut, the domestic firm  still can and finds it profitable to do so.  Any price 
differential is  matched by the foreign  firm whereas any tie is  undercut by the domestic one so that the unique 
equilibrium is the zero-profit one. 
9 undertaking.  Matching the domestic quality results in a zero profit outcome, i.e.  zero profits. 
By slightly improving upon the domestic quality, the foreign firm can secure positive profits.  In 
other words, under the hierarchy sD  ;:::::  sF, the foreign best reply is invariably sF = sD.  But we 
also know that foreign profits are increasing at sF = sD.  From the free trade analysis, we know 
that the payoff of a  high-quality firm is  monotonically increasing in its own quality.  In other 
words, because of the price-undertaking, the foreign firm is  always better-off by matching and 
even improving upon the domestic quality.  Its best reply is then invariably equal to 1,  whatever 
the domestic quality. 
The previous analysis of the best replies at the quality stage of the game shows that in the 
presence of the price-undertaking there is a unique SPE exhibiting (sD  = 4/7, sF = 1), i.e.  the 
equilibrium in which the domestic firm optimally differentiates with a lower quality.  We have 
therefore established the following proposition. 
Proposition 1  When the  foreign  product is regarded  as  'similar' to  the European product re-
gardless of the quality difference between them (,6.  =  1), European Antidumping Policy taking the 
form of a price-undertaking induces the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (sD  =  4/7, sF =  1) 
An immediate corollary is then established. 
Corollary 1  The price-undertaking leads to a lower expected domestic Welfare.' 
The proof of the corollary is straightforward. We only have to compare the unique equilibrium 
induced by the possibility of a price-undertaking, henceforth the 'undertaking' equilibrium (sD = 
4/7, sF  1)  to the two equilibria applying  under free  trade:  {(sD  =  1, sF  =  4/7), (sD  = 
1 n.  Note first  that consumers  are indifferent  as to who  is  selling what so  that 
the two equilibria are strictly equivalent from  a European consumer Welfare viewpoint.  The 
only difference comes from the fact that the high quality firm makes higher profits.  Therefore, 
whenever the foreign firm is the high quality firm, domestic Welfare is lower because more profits 
go " abroad". We note then that the anti-dumping policy precisely selects as the unique possible 
equilibrium, the equilibrium which sees the foreign  producer as the quality leader, i.e.  the one 
involving the lower domestic Welfare.  It follows  that the expected domestic Welfare must be 
10 lower in the presence of antidumping than without it since the probability of seeing the domestic 
firm selling the high quality product is nil under the AD policy. 
The protection offered to the domestic firm by a price-undertaking applies only at the price 
competition stage.  But the relaxation of price competition has long  run implications.  As  a 
result of the price-undertaking, the foreign firm cannot survive with a lower quality.  The only 
way out is to be more aggressive at the quality stage.  The price-undertaking allows the foreign 
firm to credibly commit to the best available quality, against any possible quality chosen by the 
domestic firm. 
3  Comments 
The result established in Proposition 1 result can be compared to Boccard and Wauthy (1998) 
where it is shown that a quota on foreign imports, which relaxes price competition in the last 
stage also results in more aggressive behaviour in the quality stage by one of the firms.  In the 
case of a quota however, it is the domestic firm which behaves more aggressively thereby leading 
to a Welfare increase for the domestic country. 
Proposition 1 is also reminiscent of some results obtained in the literature on Leapfrogging, 
as surveyed for instance by Herguera and Lutz [1998].  This literature essentially focuses on the 
conditions under which a  domestic government can induce leapfrogging by the domestic firm 
in equilibrium through an adequate choice of policy instruments (subsidies, tariffs,  quota, or 
minimum quality standards).  In our paper, "perverse"leapfrogging occurs  as a  result of AD 
policy, turning a low quality foreign firm into a high quality one.  Note that here, leapfrogging 
is  an undesirable  side-effect of the anti-dumping policy whereas domestic leapfrogging  is  the 
objective pursued by governments in Herguera and Lutz  [1998].  In fact,we  have shown that 
the price-undertaking leaves no other choice for the foreign firm than to leapfrog the European 
one.  As pointed out by a referee, the leapfrogging issue is even more relevant under a sequential 
setting whith the domestic firm  playing first.11  Assuming again that quality is  costless12  the 
"See Donnenfeld and Weber [1992J  for  a  general treatement of sequential entries in vertically differentiated 
industries 
l'The case of positive costs is considered below 
11 domestic firm would always choose the high quality under free trade whereas in the presence of 
the price undertaking, it would choose the low quality one, i.e.  leapfrogging would always occur. 
Overall,  the idea that trade policy affects  quality  choices  made by the firms,  and  more 
specifically result into quality upgrading by importers is supported by several recent empirical 
studies.  Feenstra (1988) showed that under the US VER between 1981 and 1985, both the price 
and the quality of Japanese cars were affected by the presence of the VER. Aw and Roberts 
(1986)  evaluating the 1977-81  quota on footwear from  Korea and Taiwan find that the quota 
lead to the quality upgrading of most import bundles throughout this period.  No such empirical 
evidence exists yet for the case of price-undertaking.  In this respect our analysis suggests that 
similar effects could be observed.  It is moreover worth reminding that a price-undertaking are 
often viewed as aVER "in disguise". In fact, after multilateral trade talks at the WTO, the use 
of tariffs and VERs has been reduced or abolished.  However they have been replaced by "new" 
types of protection, mainly in the form of antidumping duties and price undertakings13  which 
are generally regarded as less transparent and far more selective. 
Since our results have been derived using a very stylized model, we discuss now the implica-
tions of relaxing several of our assumptions.  The qualitative implication of proposition 1 holds 
true under more general settings.  Anti-dumping policies of the type we have discussed are very 
likely to be Welfare decreasing once its impact on quality choice is fully taken into account. 
Consider first the case where the definition of "similar"  product does not cover the whole 
quality spectrum.  This amounts to assume that A  < 1.  As previously,  the free  trade equi-
librium involving a high quality foreign product is  not affected.  As for  the alternative quality 
configuration, two cases are possible.  First, for  A  < 3/7, the free  trade equilibrium involving 
(sD  =  1, sF = 4/7) is  not affected either.  To see  this,  consider the following:  by choosing a 
quality level  sF  =  4/7, the foreign  firm  is  in no  danger of "injuring"  the domestic industry 
because products are sufficiently different in quality, i.e.  they are not considered as similar ones. 
Domestic Welfare is therefore not affected in this case. 
For A  EJ3/7, 1[,  the free trade equilibrium whereby the foreign firm sells the lower  quality 
would induce a price-undertaking, since products would be viewed as similar.  However, in this 
13S.  Laird (1999) refers to price-undertakings as "Voluntary Export Price Restraints" 
12 case, the foreign firm cannot credibly commit to the best available quality against any domestic 
quality choice.  In particular, against  a  high  sD, the best response in quality by the foreign 
firm  consists in choosing a quality level that lies "just below"  the limit of what is  considered 
to be "similar"  by the European Antidumping authorities (sF =  1 - fl.).  We therefore obtain 
a second SPE exhibiting (sD  =  1, sF  =  1 - fl.).  It is  then a matter of computations to show 
that the corresponding domestic Welfare is  a decreasing function of fl..  This suggests that the 
European government would gain from adopting a restrictive view of "similarity".  Or in other 
words,  the European government would be  better off by exempting vertically differentiated goods 
from antidumping policies. 
As mentioned when describing the model, introducing a positive cost for quality would not 
affect the qualitative nature of our results.  Indeed, the qualitative implication of proposition 1 
is  that the foreign firm will be more agressive at the quality stage because of the A-D  policy. 
Assuming that quality involves a sunk cost c( Si) as is usually done in the literature.  14 will clearly 
not affect the foreign firm's incentives.  More generally, the presence of a positive cost for quality 
is  known to affect  the extent of product differentiation  (See  Motta [1993]).  By contrast, the 
argument underlying Proposition 1 rests exclusively on the incentives to differentiate, and more 
precisely on the necessity of relaxing price competition that is rooted in the demand side of the 
model.  In any case, one of the firms must be the low quality one.  Because of the antidumping 
legislation,  the foreign  firm  is  systematically "at risk"  when  choosing  a  lower  quality.  As a 
consequence, to choose a lower quality cannot be a valid equilibrium strategy for  the foreigner, 
irrespective of costs.  Still, introducing costs would allow us to take into account the possibility 
that domestic and foreign  firms  may not be equally efficient  in producing quality.  As argued 
by Herguera and Lutz [1998), two pure strategy equilibria in quality will exist as long as firms 
are not too different in the cost of providing quality.  Of particular interest to us is  the case 
where the foreign producer would be less efficient.  An obvious possibility in this case is that the 
foreign firm cannot provide a high quality at a sufficiently low cost.  The likely effect of the A-D 
policy is then to exclude the firm  from the market since selling a low quality is not profitable 
because of the undertaking. As a protection policy, this is very effective but the resulting impact 
"See Lehmann-Grube (1997) for a general treatment of quality choices with sunk cost. 
13 on Domestic Welfare is less clear because the domestic producer enjoys Monopoly power in the 
market.  15 
Introducing costs may also be helpful in explaining the following paradox: our results clearly 
suggest that AD policies may hurt domestic producers, so why do domestic firms lobby for  it? 
In this respect, it is important to stress first that the kind of effects involved in our analysis are 
typically long-term ones, so that a possible explanation is to be found in firms being shortsighted. 
This explanation is clearly not entirely convincing although it is worth reminding that in the case 
of import quotas, domestic firms also were actively lobbying while the induced quality upgrading 
of imports ultimately hurt them.  If, on the other hand domestic firms are quite confident that 
they benefit from an cost advantage in producing the high quality level, then they could lobby 
for  AD  policy,  precisely in order to use it to deter foreign  entry.  In this respect, our results 
suggest that the threat of price-undertakings could in fact provide a strong incentive for foreign 
industries to improve their ability to produce high quality products before entering the European 
market. 
Another limitation of our analysis is that we  have confined ourselves to the case of price 
competition.  In this respect,  it is  important to note that,  under our zero  cost for  quality 
assumption, no product differentiation would prevail under Cournot competition and free trade. 
It is indeed easy to show that the unique SPE of a two-stage game with quality choice followed 
by quantity competition involves both firms choosing the best available qUality.16  In this case, 
the A-D  legislation would  not apply.  Cournot  competition yields  product differentiation  in 
equilibrium only if the cost  for  quality is  strictly positive.  If this cost  is  the same for  both 
firms,  there will exists two symmetric SPE exhibiting product differentiation.  Again,  a price-
undertaking will affect quality choice only in the case where the foreigner sells the low quality 
product.  Since the price-undertaking means that prices have to be equal, it will again be true 
that the foreign firms end up with zero demand.  We are then lead to conclude that, as under 
15In the presence of costs for quality, the leapfrogging issue also can be reconsidered.  Obviously ,tbe presence 
of costs asymmetry between domestic and foreign firms  could induce other outcomes.  For instance,  if quality 
involves a large sunk cost, the threat of a price-undertaking could deter entry from foreigners whereas if it enjoys 
a cost advantage, it could leapfrog the domestic firm. 
l·See for instance Eaton and Harrald (1992) for  a proof of this result. 
14 price competition, the incentive to adopt a low  quality profile is drastically weakened for  the 
foreign firm. 
Sofar, we  have conducted the analysis assuming that the government will impose a  price-
undertaking.  However, EU antidumping policy can also involve an antidumping duty on foreign 
imports.  In principle,  the purpose of the duty is  the same as  that of a  price-undertaking, 
namely to eliminate the injury as measured by the extent of price undercutting in the absence of 
measures.  Absorption of the duty by the foreign firm is outruled by law.  Thus when the foreign 
firm  does not fully  pass  through the duty to consumers,  it will  be subject to an additional 
penalty.  A duty thus results into identical market prices.  In our particular setting, this leaves a 
low quality firm with zero demand.  Qualitatively, firms' incentives regarding quality choice are 
roughly equivalent to those prevailing with the price undertaking. 
4  Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was twofold.  First,  we  showed  how  price competition between  a 
domestic and a  foreign  firm selling vertically differentiated goods on the European market is 
affected by European antidumping protection.  We focused on the effects of price-undertakings 
on foreign imports.  Second,  we  analyzed the long term effects of such trade policies on the 
qualities offered by the firms in the European market. Our findings suggest that when accounting 
for the effect on firms' quality choices in the long-run, whenever the antidumping policy affects 
the free trade outcome, it leads to an overall Welfare loss.  The intuition for our result is easily 
summarized. While a price-undertaking protects the domestic firm in the short run by relaxing 
price competition, it allows the foreign  firm to credibly commit to a high quality in the first 
stage of the game (precisely to avoid the price-undertaking in the second stage).  The best reply 
of the domestic firm is then to produce the low quality variant. This is likely to be damaging for 
the Domestic Welfare because it increases profit diversion.  While quality upgrading has already 
been established empirically for  other trade instruments (quotas and VER), the argument put 
forward  in this paper,  namely that AD-policy can also lead to quality upgrading of imports, 
remains to be verified in further research. 
15 A  Appendix:  Price Competition under vertical differentiation 
Consider a two-stage game with quality choice in the first stage. In the second stage, two firms 
sell indivisible goods differentiated by their quality index, respectively denoted by sh and Sl with 
sh > Sl.  Consumers in the market buy at most one unit of the good and exhibit heterogeneous 
preferences.  More precisely, they are identified by their "taste for quality", x, which is uniformly 
distributed in the interval  [0, 1].  The net utility of consuming good i  =  {h, l} for  a consumer 
with taste x is defined by the following equation: 
(A.1) 
where pi is  the unit price of good i.  The default utility of no-consumption is  assumed to be 
zero.  We  assume that firms  choose qualities at zero  cost.  The range of possible qualities is 
exogeneously bounded between zero and 1, i.e.  Si  E [0,1]. 
We develop the construction of firms' best replies in the pricing game because they provide 
a very useful benchmark for the analysis of antidumping policies. 
Observe first that for i  E {l, h}, the consumer located at xi = pi  / Si enjoys zero utility, hence, 
every consumer with taste x  > xi is  willing to buy product i  at price pi.  Potential markets 
are thus respectively [x', 1]  and [x\ 1].  The second step is to identify the marginal consumer i 
who is indifferent between the two products hand l.  Solving for is! - p! =  ish - ph, we obtain 
h  I 
i(p!,ph) =  ?;:::;,.  Obviously,  any consumer x> i  prefers h to l whereas the contrary prevails 
for  x < i. Observing that quality levels can be re-scaled, we may set sh =  1 so that demands 
are given by (A.2)  and (A.3) 
ifp!~phi 
ifV>phi 
if p!  ~  phs! 
if p! > phs' 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
The particular shape of demands reflects the fact that in vertically differentiated industries, 
the high quality firm may exclude the low quality one from the market.  The latter,in order to 
enjoy a positive market share must quote a price V  significantly lower than ph  to compensate 
16 for  a lower quality (pi < phsl).  Note also that since x E [0,1]' the market cannot be covered in 
equillibrium, expcet perhaps for the case where sl = o. 
The profit of the low quality firm is given by equation (A.4) 
(AA) 
The solution to ~  =  0 is 1/i(ph) =  r!:.f.  Since 1jJ1(.)  always lies strictly in the region where 
firm I enjoys a positive market share, the low quality firm best reply is fully described by if}. 
As  for  the high quality firm,  two  regions  are of interest.  The monopoly region  and the 
duopoly one.  In the monopoly region  (PI  > phsl), the best reply is  the monopoly price  1/2 
which is feasible if and only if pi > sZ /2.  Otherwise, 7[h  is strictly increasing in the monopoly 
region and we always reach the duopoly region,where the profit is given by equation (A.5) 
(A.5) 
The solution to ~  = 0 is 1jJh(pl) = t+~-sl and this is feasible whenever 1jJh(.)  ::; pi /sl ¢=} pi ::; 
sl~~~f').  Otherwise, 7[h(.,pl)  is  strictly increasing in the duopoly region and the frontier price 
pi / sl  is optimal.  Since we have  ,I~~~t) < ~, the best reply of firm h is 
I 
"I.h(_l)  'f  I < 81(1-.1) 
0/  Jl  IP_~ 
¢h(pl,ph) =  p  •.  1  if ,1(l-fl)  <  1< i. 
::r  2-8  - P  - 2 
1/2  if  pi  ~  ~ 
(A.6) 
Figure 1 depicts a standard configuration for  free  trade best replies, where ¢h  is  drawn in 
plain bold and ¢l in bold dashed.  As one can see on figure 1, the free trade equilibrium is given 
by the intersection of 1jJh  and 1jJ1,  i.e.  in the region where both firms enjoy a positive market 
share, which in turn requires that the low quality firm names a price that is strictly lower the 









Using equations (A.4)  and (A.6),  it is  a matter of computations to show that the unique 
Nash equilibrium is defined by equations (A.7) and (A.8) 
sl(1 _  sl) 
pl* =  --':---;--'-
4-s1 
h*  2(1 - at) 
p  =  -4---s 1 -
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
Plugging these prices into (A.3)  and (A.5),  we obtain the reduced forms  for  payoffs at the 
quality stage as a function of the products' quality ranking.  Straightforward computations then 
establish Lemma 1. 
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